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Abstract In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. 
To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488–503, (2009) and carry 
out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we 
presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with 
social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game 
in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison 
of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results 
provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for 
China.
Keywords Framing · Bribery behaviour
JEL classification C91 · D73 · D91
1  Introduction and motivation
In the last decades, there has been increasing interest in the effects of framing on 
decision making and experimental tasks. In particular, recent studies have reported 
the existence of significant framing effects in prisoner’s dilemma games (Ross and 
Ward, 1996; Liberman et  al. 2004), public goods games (Andreoni 1995; Cook-
son 2000; Rege and Telle 2004), and dictator games (Eckel and Grossman 1996; 
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Branas-Garza 2007). There is little consensus among economists, however, on the 
existence of framing effects on bribery behaviour.
Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006, AHS hereafter) first investigate whether, and 
to what extent, presenting a bribery game framed as a (repeated) corrupt exchange 
between a firm and a public official, as opposed to the same game framed neutrally 
and in abstract terms, would reduce bribery behaviour.1 In the study, the authors 
find no evidence that loading the context of the instructions with an immoral ethi-
cal preconception has an effect on bribery behaviour, for a sample of students at the 
University of Bonn.
As argued by Barr and Serra (2009), however, the obtained null results may be 
driven by either artificiality, in that participants did not identify themselves with 
either being a firm or a public official, or by the fact that the original AHS game was 
repeated for thirty rounds with fixed matching and hence also involved feelings of 
trust and reciprocity.2 Barr and Serra (2009) tackle these potential issues by design-
ing a simple one-shot petty corruption experiment, in which participants interact 
with each other as ‘citizens’ and ‘officials.’ The main advantages of their setting 
are that (1) all students are citizens and, consequently, more likely to identify them-
selves with the frame adopted, and (2) in a one-shot game, feelings such as trust and 
reciprocity are negligible. Using a sample of students at the University of Oxford, 
the authors do find evidence of framing effects, and successfully show that the exist-
ence of a framing effect depends on the specific experimental design employed as 
well as the degree of artificiality of the corruption frame applied.
In this study, we contribute to the literature by replicating the Barr and Serra 
(2009) petty corruption game in two highly corrupt countries, China and Uganda, 
currently ranked 77th and 151st out of 176 respectively in the Corruption Percep-
tion Index. In 2012, China initiated the largest campaign against graft and corrup-
tion ever made in the history of its Communist Party, leading to the indictment of 
over 120 high-ranking officials and 100,000 individuals. The latter, although its cor-
ruption level keeps worsening, still has not embraced any official anti-corruption 
campaign. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for 
Uganda, but not for China.
2  Experimental design
The game includes 15 players. We randomly assigned players to three roles: private 
citizens, public officials, and other members of society (henceforth, ‘citizens’, ‘offi-
cials’, and ‘members of society’).
Each citizen is randomly matched with an official, and gets an initial endowment 
of I
C
 . He has to decide whether to offer a bribe to the matched official for a corrupt 
service, for which he will obtain a benefit of V  . Let B be a dummy variable that 
equals unity if the citizen chooses to offer a bribe, and let b ∈ {1, 2,… , 20} denote 
1 The game was first designed by Abbink et al. (2002).
2 See Bardsley (2005) for a discussion of artificiality in experimental economics.
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the amount of the bribe offered. Notice, if the citizen decides to offer a bribe to the 
official, he will pay a (deterministic) cost, denoted K, which reflects the expected 
cost of getting caught and punished.
Each official receives an initial endowment of I
O
 . He has to decide whether or not 
to accept the bribe offered by the matched citizen. Let A be a dummy variable which 
equals one if the official decides to accept the bribe. Similar to above, if the official 
accepts the bribe, he will also incur a deterministic loss,K , reflecting the expected 
cost of being caught.
Finally, each member of society receives an initial endowment of I
M
 . They are a 
passive group, and as such do not make any decisions in the game. They will, how-
ever, incur a loss of endowment, h , each time a citizen-official pair chooses to act 
corruptly.
Let Y
C
, Y
O
, and Y
M
 represent the final payoffs of the citizens, officials, and mem-
bers of society, respectively, at the end of the bribery game. Thus, the payoff sched-
ule for the three types of players can be written in the following compact form:
where N ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} represents the number of citizen-officials pairs who suc-
cessfully exchange bribes. Following the original paper, we set IC = IO = 35 money 
units and IM = 25 money units.3 Further, we set V = 20 , h = 4 , and K = 5 . A total 
(1)YC =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
IC if B = 0
IC − K if B = 1 and A = 0
IC + V − K − b if B = 1 and A = 1,
(2)YO =
{
IO if A = 0
IO + b − K if A = 1
(3)YM = IM − N ⋅ h,
Table 1  Summary statistics
The table presents summary statistics of the experimental sample, comparing China and Uganda. Stand-
ard deviations in parenthesis
(1) China (2) Uganda (3) p value
Female 0.77 (0.424) 0.34 (0.474) 0.000
Years of age 21.45 (1.952) 23.87 (3.573) 0.000
Father years of schooling 11.82 (2.867) 10.82 (3.864) 0.000
Mother years of schooling 10.95 (3.326) 9.13 (4.198) 0.000
Observations 396 405 801
3 This difference in initial endowments reflects the fact that other members of the society do not usually 
have the means to engage in corrupt behaviour.
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of 54 experimental sessions were conducted, 27 in each country.4 Every session 
involved 15 players, with the exception of two sessions in China, in which we only 
managed to recruit 9 and 12 players, respectively. Table 1 presents demographic fea-
tures of the sample of students, and reports that participants in China were younger 
and there was a higher proportion of females.5 The sessions were conducted in vari-
ous teaching and seminar rooms, depending on availability, and carried out with pen 
and paper. Participants were randomly allocated to their role, and at no time knew 
which player they were matched with. Besides the instructions, on each desk, par-
ticipants found tables describing the payoff schedule of the game, and an envelope 
containing a specially designed form for players to express their preferences. In par-
ticular, citizens had to state the amount, if any, they wanted to offer to their matched 
official; officials, instead, had to state whether they would accept or reject each one 
of the possible bribes, b ∈ {1, 2,… , 20} . This allows us to identify officials who 
would reject all of the possible bribes, as well as the minimum amount offered for 
the bribe to be accepted. Once all the forms were filled, envelopes were collected 
and payoffs calculated.
We had two treatments of the game. In the framed treatment, each role and action 
was embedded in the social context, as explained above. In the neutral treatment, 
however, we removed the social context and presented the game in an abstract man-
ner. Specifically, player roles went from citizen, official, and member of society, to 
player A, player B, and player C, respectively; and the word “bribe” was replaced 
with the word “offer”. In each country, we randomly drew 14 sessions to be pre-
sented in the framed version, and the remaining in the neutral one.
Before presenting our result, it is important to mention the power of this replica-
tion. Accordingly, we follow the guidelines of Nikiforakis and Slonim (2015) and 
Drichoutis et  al. (2015), and implement a power calculation for our study to find 
whether or not there is an effect statistically significant at the 5% level. Given our 
sample size, and the observed means and standard deviations in the original study of 
Barr and Serra (2009), the power of our experiment is 99%.6
3  Results
Table 2 reports the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. Specifically, in columns 
(1) and (2) we compare the behaviour under the neutral and framed treatments 
for the Chinese sample, and in column (3) we report the p value of a t-test which 
compares the means of the two groups. Similarly, in columns (4), (5), and (6), we 
report the same for the participants from Uganda. The table shows that framing had 
6 Table 6 in the “Appendix” compares our experimental results with those of Barr and Serra (2009).
4 In order to increase the representativeness of our samples, experiments were carried out in Kampala 
and Jinja, in Uganda, and Beijing, Ningbo, and Chengdu in China.
5 It is important to emphasise that regression analysis can only partially account for this important dif-
ference in composition of men and women across countries. In order to dispel potential issues, in Table 7 
in the “Appendix”, we check for the possibility of a composition effect, but this does not seem to be the 
case.
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virtually no effect on the behaviour of participants in China. Whether the game was 
played in the neutral or in the framed version, an average of 4.6 successful bribes 
per session occurred, that is, citizens’ offers were successfully accepted by the ran-
domly paired officials. The table shows that only a small proportion of Chinese stu-
dents either did not offer any bribes (8%), or did not accept any possible bribes (2%). 
Similarly, framing had no effect on the conditional amount of bribes offered, nor 
accepted.
Conversely, framing had a strong and significant effect in Uganda. Specifically, 
students who played the bribery game in the framed form were significantly less 
likely to either offer or accept any bribe, and consequently, the number of success-
ful bribes in framed sessions were significantly lower than in the neutral ones. The 
table, moreover, shows that while framing has a strong effect on the propensity to 
either offer or accept a bribe, it does not have an effect on the conditional amount 
offered nor on the conditional amount accepted.
In Tables 3 and 4, we check the robustness of our results in a regression frame-
work that allows us to control for a set of potentially confounding variables, as well 
as allowing for interdependence within sessions by clustering. Specifically, Table 3 
reports framing effects on the citizens, and in Table 4 we report estimated coeffi-
cients for the officials. The results confirm our descriptive analysis and show strong 
and significant framing effects for the sample from Uganda, and no significant effect 
for China. Further, in order to directly test whether there is a significant differen-
tial framing effect between the two countries, in Table 5, we conduct a regression 
analysis on the pooled data in which we include an interaction term combining the 
framing dummy variable together with the Uganda dummy variable. The table con-
firms a statistically significant differential framing effect for the private citizens in 
Table 3  Framing effects for private citizens
The table presents regression estimates of the effect of framing on corruption behaviour. Probit models 
were estimated if the dependent variable was dichotomous [0, 1]. Standard errors in parenthesis are clus-
tered at the session level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
China Uganda
(1) Offered no bribe (2) Mean bribe 
offered
(3) Offered no bribe (4) Mean bribe 
offered
Framed [0, 1] − 0.067 (0.367) 0.524 (0.599) 0.727*** (0.266) − 0.784 (1.081)
Covariates
 Female − 0.186 (0.431) − 0.387 (0.727) − 0.235 (0.277) − 2.814** (1.144)
 Years of age − 0.164 (0.142) − 0.010 (0.146) − 0.025 (0.043) 0.028 (0.151)
 Beijing 0.107 (0.557) − 0.702 (0.816)
 Chengdu 0.450 (0.543) 0.683 (0.835)
 Kampala − 0.016 (0.312) 1.269 (1.310)
Constant 1.886 (3.137) 8.216** (3.356) − 0.524 (1.194) 6.057 (4.297)
Observations 132 124 133 104
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Uganda with respect to the private citizens in China, but reports no differential fram-
ing effect for the public officials between the two countries.
4  Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we replicate Barr and Serra (2009) one-shot petty corruption game, 
and compare framing effects between two countries with a high level of corruption: 
China and Uganda. We find strong and significant framing effects for the partici-
pants from Uganda. Specifically, students exposed to the framed version of the petty 
corruption game were significantly less likely to offer, as well as accept, any bribe. 
On the contrary, we do not find any significant effects of framing on bribery behav-
iour in China.
The results for Uganda are consistent with those obtained by Barr and Serra 
(2009); however, this is not the case for China, suggesting other factors might be 
causing the differences in framing effects between the two countries. Follow-
ing Cooper et al. (1999) and Barr and Serra (2010), the magnitude of the framing 
effect may change depending on the degree participants have been exposed to a cor-
rupt environment, as well as on the social norms and values prevailing in a certain 
society. For example, it is likely that in a society with a higher exposure to cor-
ruption, in which people engage in bribery in their everyday life, individuals would 
be less responsive to the corruption frame. As both China and Uganda have high 
levels of corruption, it is not obvious that differences in the degree of corruption in 
the two countries explain our result. Indeed, our results are somewhat paradoxical: 
Table 4  Framing effects for public officials
The table presents regression estimates of the effect of framing on corruption behaviour. Probit models 
were estimated if the dependent variable was dichotomous [0, 1]. Standard errors in parenthesis are clus-
tered at the session level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
China Uganda
(1) Accepted no bribe (2) Minimum accept-
able bribe
(3) Accepted no bribe (4) Minimum 
acceptable 
bribe
Framed [0, 1] 0.473 (0.567) 0.230 (0.641) 0.947*** (0.335) -0.071 (0.794)
Covariates
 Female − 1.034 (0.716) − 0.438 (0.831) − 0.214 (0.340) − 0.469 (0.839)
 Years of age − 0.173 (0.131) − 0.617*** (0.177) − 0.058 (0.077) 0.119 (0.128)
 Beijing 4.232 (702.133) − 1.730* (0.876)
 Chengdu 5.096 (702.133) − 1.072 (0.918)
 Kampala 0.563 (0.454) 1.930* (0.983)
Constant − 2.421 (702.138) 26.115*** (4.028) − 0.781 (2.009) 9.034** (3.577)
Observations 132 128 132 115
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Transparency International’s data (based on perceptions by elites and business peo-
ple) suggest Uganda has higher levels of corruption than China. Uganda certainly 
lacks China’s fierce official anti-corruption drive. However, our Ugandan subjects 
are more sensitive to framing the experiment in terms of corruption than their 
Chinese counterparts. Nor is there clear evidence that corruption is more socially 
acceptable in China than Uganda. Indeed, in the World Values Survey, Chinese citi-
zens were less likely to agree that “it was justifiable that someone accepts a bribe in 
the course of their duties”. On scale of 1 = never justifiable to 10 = always justifiable, 
China averaged 1.20 in 1995 while Uganda averaged 2.14 in 2001—the latest years 
available (Inglehart et al. 2014; Gatti et al. 2003).
Further research is necessary to explain our results. This may be a case where 
there is a disconnect between the attitudes people espouse in public opinion surveys 
and their behaviour in private games. One may disapprove of something in public—
particularly when done by others—but engage in it personally in private. China has 
a culture of Guanxi (or personal relations) in business that can involve gift giving 
which potentially strays into corruption (Zhan 2012). For example, the government 
has recently cracked down on lavish banquets by public officials. A 2014 Pew survey 
of public attitudes found 38% of Chinese respondents thought bribery was important 
for getting ahead—the highest proportion in all the countries in the world and ahead 
of the 15% average for the African countries in the sample (which included Uganda, 
but the country specific figure was not available, Gao, 2014). Potentially related to 
this, corruption has sometimes been seen by economists as “greasing the wheels” 
of economic development in China by substituting for private property rights and 
the rule of law. For example, Qian (2003) argues that the incentivising cadres was 
the key to successful reform in China: local officials would encourage the develop-
ment of publicly or collectively owned enterprises because they received a private 
share of the benefits (sometimes through corruption). Conversely, economists study-
ing Uganda (and indeed the rest of Africa), tend to view corruption unequivocally a 
barrier to economic development, raising the costs of doing business, undermining 
government services, private property rights and the rule of law (Godfrey and Yu 
2014). Future research to understand better private behaviour regarding corruption 
may be very important for policy, as anti-graft campaigns may not be successful if 
citizens do not adhere to the expected norms against corruption.
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See Tables 6 and 7.
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